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We used a hybrid transmission and economic model 
to evaluate the relative merits of stockpiling antiviral drugs 
and vaccine for pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation. In the ab-
sence of any intervention, our base-case assumptions gen-
erated a population clinical attack rate of 31.1%. For at least 
some parameter values, population prepandemic vaccina-
tion strategies were effective at containing an outbreak of 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza until the arrival of a matched vaccine. 
Because of the uncertain nature of many parameters, we 
used a probabilistic approach to determine the most cost-
effective strategies. At a willingness to pay of >A$24,000 
per life-year saved, more than half the simulations showed 
that a prepandemic vaccination program combined with an-
tiviral treatment was cost-effective in Australia. 
I
nﬂ  uenza pandemics of varying severity occurred 3 times 
in the last century (1918, 1957, and 1968); the ﬁ  rst inﬂ  u-
enza pandemic of the 21st century occurred in 2009. Be-
fore this latest pandemic, awareness had been heightened 
by the emergence of the highly pathogenic (H5N1) strain 
(1). In response, many countries have developed detailed 
plans aimed at the mitigation of a future pandemic. A key 
aspect of many pandemic plans is the stockpiling of anti-
viral drugs (neuraminidase inhibitors) for treatment or pro-
phylaxis (2,3).
The stockpiling of prepandemic vaccine is also an area 
of active consideration (4). Although a matched vaccine 
(developed speciﬁ  cally for the emergent strain) is likely to 
offer the best protection, the delay in producing such a vac-
cine is a major obstacle. The stockpiling of prepandemic 
vaccine based on currently available strains avoids this de-
lay but such vaccine is likely to provide lower efﬁ  cacy than 
a matched vaccine. There is also a substantial risk that the 
pandemic strain will be of a different subtype than that cho-
sen for the stockpiled vaccine. The emergence of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 illustrates this point.
Mathematical models of disease transmission have 
been used to assess the feasibility of pandemic mitiga-
tion strategies (5–10). However, of the limited numbers of 
published economic evaluations on pandemic stockpiling 
(11–14), to our knowledge only 1 recent study has attempt-
ed to directly model herd protection (14). We explored the 
cost-effectiveness of stockpiling prepandemic vaccine and 
antiviral drugs for pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation.
Methods
Overview
An age-stratiﬁ  ed transmission model (susceptible, ex-
posed, infected, removed) was used to calculate clinical at-
tack rates (CAR) and antiviral drug consumption, which 
became inputs in a decision analytic economic model as 
represented in Figure 1 (MATLAB version 2008a [www.
mathworks.com]). The primary outcome from the economic 
model was the incremental cost per life-year saved (LYS). 
Economic results are reported per person in the population 
to facilitate understanding for an international audience. 
We addressed the uncertainty in many of the model pa-
rameters by performing extensive sensitivity analyses, in-
cluding probabilistic sensitivity analysis using 5,000 Latin 
hypercube samples drawn from parameter distributions. A 
detailed description of the transmission model and a full 
list of model parameters and distributions can be found 
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Strategies
We considered prepandemic inﬂ  uenza  vaccination 
in isolation and in combination with antiviral treatment. 
Four strategies for pandemic mitigation were examined 
(Table 1). In all strategies, a small stockpile of antiviral drugs 
was used for prophylaxis of case contacts and treatment of 
clinical cases in an initial containment effort and, after a de-
lay of 6 months, a matched vaccine was delivered. In isola-
tion, this intervention was labeled strategy 1.
Demographics
We divided the Australian population into 3 age 
groups: 0–19 years (26% [5,513,878], 20–64 years (61% 
[12,744,215], and >65 years (13% [2,759,129]) (15). Rates 
of mixing were age dependent and based on a recent large 
study of contact patterns in the European Union (16).
Vaccine Parameters
Immunogenicity data provide evidence of prepandem-
ic vaccine efﬁ  cacy (VE) in humans (17). However, this ef-
ﬁ  cacy will also depend on how closely the prepandemic 
vaccine strain matches the pandemic strain that emerges. 
We assumed that 2 doses of prepandemic vaccine would 
reduce susceptibility (relative hazard of infection) by 40% 
in persons <65 years of age. For the >65 years of age group, 
VE may be reduced (18). Thus, in our base-case model, we 
halved the VE for this age group. Modeled efﬁ  cacy was 
also dependent on the number of doses, time since the last 
dose, and vaccine type (prepandemic or matched).
The ﬁ  rst dose of prepandemic vaccine was assumed 
to be given coincident with the ﬁ  rst local case-patient, fol-
lowed 21 days later by the second dose. In all strategies, 
the ﬁ  rst dose of matched vaccine was provided 180 days 
after the ﬁ  rst local case was identiﬁ  ed in Australia; the 
second dose was administered 21 days later in strategies 1 
and 2 only. Although 2 doses of a matched vaccine would 
be ordered under all strategies, in base-case only 1 dose of 
matched vaccine was administered in strategies involving 2 
doses of a prepandemic vaccine (strategies 3 and 4). Popu-
lation vaccine coverage (both prepandemic and matched) 
was assumed to be 80% (19).
Antiviral Drug Parameters
In the base-case model, we estimated the efﬁ  cacy of an-
tiviral treatment for preventing hospitalization as 59% (20). 
We assumed the same antiviral drug efﬁ  cacy for preventing 
death as for hospitalization. The effect of antiviral treatment 
on inﬂ  uenza transmission in the community is unclear (21), 
and we assumed no reduction in infectivity of treated cases. 
When antiviral treatment was given, it was provided to 80% 
of persons with clinical disease (those who sought primary 
healthcare). Antiviral drug strategies contained stockpiles to 
cover 40% of the population (≈8 million courses). However, 
all strategies assumed a limited antiviral drug stockpile (≈0.2 
million courses) to be used in initial containment efforts for 
treatment of clinical cases and prophylaxis of case contacts. 
We assumed that the antiviral prophylaxis treatment of con-
tacts, during the initial containment effort, reduced suscepti-
bility and infectiousness by 70% and 60%, respectively (22). 
A static percentage (10%) of viruses were assumed resistant 
to antiviral drugs.
Disease Estimates
The CAR during a pandemic was determined by using 
the transmission model and was primarily a function of R0 
(1.7) (23–25) and the percentage of asymptomatic infec-
tions (50%) (26). The basic reproductive number (R0) rep-
resents the number of secondary cases that a representative 
person with inﬂ  uenza would infect in a fully susceptible 
population. Asymptomatic persons were assumed to be two 
thirds as infectious as symptomatic persons (9,10). We as-
sumed that 50% of those with a clinical inﬂ  uenza infection 
would seek medical care (27); most primary care would oc-
cur in general practice (80%) and the remainder in hospital 
emergency departments.
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Figure 1. Schematic of hybrid transmission and decision analytic 
economic model. [+] indicates a cloned subtree with the same 
structure as the branch above. In sensitivity analysis, the 
probabilities of healthcare utilization and death were independent 
of each other but dependent on the probability of clinical infection. 
We assumed those with serious complications would seek primary 
healthcare. SEIR, susceptible, exposed, infected, removed.
Table 1. Descriptions of 4 pharmaceutical-based pandemic 
influenza mitigation strategies*
Strategy no.  Description
1 Minimum pharmaceutical intervention 
2 Antiviral treatment of those clinically infected 
3 Population prepandemic vaccination 
4 Strategies 2 + 3 
*All strategies included an initial antiviral containment effort and 
distribution of a matched vaccine to the population 180 days after the first 
locally acquired case. RESEARCH
The rates of hospitalization and death were deﬁ  ned 
relative to the CAR by using a case-hospitalization rate and 
case-fatality rate. We used age-speciﬁ  c case-hospitaliza-
tion rates (0–19 years = 1.875%, 20–64 years = 2.5%, >65 
years = 5%) and case-fatality rates (0–19 years = 0.75%, 
20–64 years = 1%, >65 years = 2%). There are no reliable 
estimates of when a future pandemic might occur. We used 
a base-case delay to a pandemic of 5 years.
Cost Estimates
As recommended by Australian pharmaceutical fund-
ing guidelines, we focused on direct healthcare costs (28) 
and performed our base-case analysis from a healthcare 
system perspective. In scenario analysis we considered a 
broader societal perspective, which included lost produc-
tion costs. Costs and effects were discounted at 5% annu-
ally (28). All costs are reported in 2005 Australian dollars.
Intervention Costs
In the base-case model, we assumed a stockpile pur-
chase price for pharmaceuticals of $12 per vaccine dose and 
$32 per antiviral course; a range of values was considered 
in sensitivity analysis. The limited shelf-life of the pharma-
ceuticals requires the renewal of stockpiles for prepandemic 
vaccine every 3 years and antiviral drugs every 5 years. The 
number of times stockpiles were replaced was based on the 
expected time to a pandemic. We assumed partial replace-
ment of the stockpile annually on a continuous basis. An 
annual storage cost for vaccines ($1, refrigeration) and anti-
viral drugs ($0.5, no refrigeration) was included.
We assumed that vaccination (and initial antiviral drug 
distribution) would be administered in mass clinics at a cost 
of $11.60 per course/dose (29). An administration cost for 
antiviral treatment was not included because this treatment 
would be given as part of a primary care visit for inﬂ  uenza 
illness. However, for strategies that included antiviral treat-
ment, the percentage of clinical cases seeking medical care 
was increased to 80%.
Healthcare Unit Costs
Hospitalization costs were based on analysis previ-
ously conducted by our group, which reviewed records 
of patients hospitalized for inﬂ  uenza and pneumonia in 
Australia (30). We estimated age-speciﬁ  c hospitalization 
costs by multiplying the average cost per day by the aver-
age length of stay for that age group (31). Expenses for 
emergency department visits for inﬂ  uenza not requiring 
hospitalization were estimated by the Australian Ambula-
tory Classes emergency department presentation cost for 
“Other respiratory diseases with procedure” (32). The cost 
of a general practitioner visit for inﬂ  uenza ($33.32) was 
based on a general practitioner survey of consultation for 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness (30).
Production Costs (Societal Perspective Only)
The costs of lost production were valued by using the 
human capital approach. Lost production was only valued 
for those employed in paid work (33). The cost attached to 
lost work days was based on average weekly earnings (34). 
Clinical inﬂ  uenza patients were assumed to have 2.6 days 
absent from work (35). We assumed that those <15 years 
of age would require 1 adult caregiver when sick. We used 
length of stay to estimate lost production for hospitalized 
patients.
Results
Clinical Outcomes
The base-case analysis used an R0 value of 1.7, which 
led to a CAR of 31.1% in the overall population in the ab-
sence of any intervention. The assumption of greater mix-
ing in children meant that this group experienced the high-
est CARs, with 38.1% in persons 0–19 years of age, 30.4% 
in persons 20–64 years of age, and 20.4% in persons >65 
years of age. In the absence of any intervention, the base-
case model produced an overall population hospitaliza-
tion rate of 782.3/100,000 persons and a mortality rate of 
312.9/100,000. Strategies incorporating a population pre-
pandemic vaccination program resulted in a low CAR and, 
consequently, a low number of hospitalizations (strategy 
3 = 136.8/100,000; strategy 4 = 79.4/100,000) and deaths 
(strategy 3 = 54.7/100,000; strategy 4 = 31.8/100,000). 
The antiviral drug treatment strategy did not affect the 
CAR but signiﬁ  cantly reduced the number of hospitaliza-
tions (strategy 2 = 450.0/100,000) and deaths (strategy 2 = 
180.0/100,000).
Several parameters were inﬂ  uential in determining the 
CARs (Figure 2). In prepandemic vaccination strategies, R0 
(Figure 2, panel A), VE (Figure 2, panel A), and vaccine 
coverage (Figure 2, panel B) played major roles in deter-
mining whether a large outbreak was prevented or simply 
mitigated. The CAR rose as R0 increased and declined as 
VE improved and coverage increased, with sharper tran-
sitions occurring as the number of secondary cases that 
a single case infects approached 1. The CAR for prepan-
demic vaccination strategies also increased markedly when 
vaccination was delayed until after a local outbreak had 
commenced (Figure 2, panel C). The number of deaths pre-
vented by antiviral treatment rises as R0 increases (Figure 
2, panel D). This increase occurs because the incidence of 
preventable disease is larger for higher values of R0. The 
effect on prepandemic vaccination strategies is similar, 
provided the strategy is largely successful in containing the 
pandemic. However, for R0 values >1.7, when this is no 
longer the case, prepandemic vaccinations strategies pre-
vented fewer deaths (Figure 2, panel D).
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Economic Outcomes
The total discounted healthcare costs for a pandemic 
in the absence of any intervention was $31.1/person in the 
population. The gross discounted cost over 5 years (includ-
ing purchase, replacement, storage, and administration) of 
a prepandemic vaccination program was $68.4/person in 
the population and the cost of an antiviral treatment pro-
gram (purchase, replacement, and storage only) over the 
same period was $24.8/person.
The base-case results for the healthcare system per-
spective are shown in Table 2. In the base-case model (R0 
= 1.7, VE = 40%), strategies 2–4 each offered increased 
effectiveness at an increased cost when compared with the 
next best strategy. Under these conditions (theoretically), 
decision makers should ﬁ  rst decide if strategy 2 offers val-
ue for money (incremental cost-effectiveness ratio [ICER] 
= $909/LYS) and then consider the value offered by each 
additional increase in spending, moving from strategy 2 
to 3 (ICER = $1,084/LYS) and then from strategy 3 to 4 
(ICER = $7,458/LYS).
From a societal perspective the least costly strategy 
was prepandemic vaccination (strategy 3), which was cost 
saving when compared with the minimum pharmaceuti-
cal intervention. Strategy 3 also dominated antiviral drug 
treatment alone (strategy 2), being more effective and less 
costly. The addition of antiviral drug treatment to prepan-
demic vaccination cost $7,404/LYS.
Sensitivity Analyses (Healthcare System 
Perspective)
Key parameters affecting the cost-effectiveness of strat-
egies included the R0 value and factors impacting vaccine or 
antiviral effectiveness. Because strategies differed in their 
sensitivity to these parameters, the cost-effectiveness of 
strategies relative to each other varied. Dominance occurs 
when a strategy is considered superior to the alternative by 
being either more effective and less costly (simple domi-
nance) or more effective and more costly but with a lower 
ICER (extended dominance) (36). At higher values of VE 
(>41%) or when the percentage of antiviral given within 48 
h was <75% (base-case = 80%), prepandemic vaccination 
dominated antiviral drug treatment alone. When the VE 
was >50% or the R0 <1.6, prepandemic vaccination alone 
was largely sufﬁ  cient to contain the pandemic, and the ad-
dition of antiviral treatment offered only a minimal incre-
mental effect at a high incremental cost (ICER >$1million 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity analyses 
of clinical outcomes as key 
parameters are varied. In 
A–C, the clinical attack rate 
(CAR) is displayed as a 
function of R0 and vaccine 
efﬁ   cacy (VE) (A), vaccine 
coverage and VE (B), and the 
delay to vaccination (C). In D, 
deaths prevented per 100,000 
population compared with no 
intervention is displayed as a 
function of R0.
Table 2. Base-case economic results per person in the population (healthcare system perspective) of 4 pharmaceutical-based 
pandemic influenza mitigation strategies*
Strategy no.  Net cost  Incremental cost  LYS  Incremental LYS  Incremental cost per LYS† 
1 65.88 – – – –
2 82.24 16.36 0.01803 0.01803 908
3 100.65 18.40 0.03501 0.01698 1,084
4 124.00 23.36 0.03814 0.00313 7,458
*LYS, life-year saved. Costs and life-years discounted at 5% annually; all costs calculated in 2005 Australian dollars.  
†Rounded to the nearest whole dollar. RESEARCH
per LYS). At lower values of VE (37%) or at higher val-
ues of R0 (1.8), prepandemic vaccination alone was domi-
nated by prepandemic vaccination combined with antiviral 
drug treatment, which offered reasonable value for money 
(ICER <$3,500/LYS) when compared with antiviral drug 
treatment alone. When we considered a VE of 20%, the 
addition of prepandemic vaccination to antiviral treatment 
alone cost ≈$9,000/LYS.
To be cost saving, prepandemic vaccine (strategy 3) 
and antiviral drug treatment (strategy 2) would have to be 
priced at <$3.1/dose and <$10.0/course when compared 
with the minimum pharmaceutical intervention. Variation 
in most other parameters did not affect the cost-effective-
ness of strategies relative to each other. When the CAR was 
reduced (20% in the absence of any intervention) as a result 
of the percentage of asymptomatic infections, the ICER of 
all strategies increased. However, all strategies still had an 
ICER <$10,000/LYS. When we assumed the pandemic 
was relatively mild (case-fatality and case-hospitalization 
rates 5× less than base-case) and occurred 30 years later, 
all strategies had ICERs >$50,000/LYS. Varying the age 
distribution of severe clinical cases (case-fatality and case-
hospitalization cases) had only a minor impact on the cost-
effectiveness. When we varied the discounting rate (to be 
either 0% or 3% for costs and effects), ICER for all strate-
gies decreased with no change to strategy order. Variation 
in other parameters was explored in probabilistic sensitiv-
ity analysis.
Probabilistic Sensitivity Analyses
Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (Figure 3) en-
able decision makers to estimate the probability that a strat-
egy is optimal as a function of their willingness to pay for 
additional units of effect. At decision makers’ willingness to 
pay >$24,000/LYS, more than half of simulations found that 
a prepandemic vaccination program combined with antiviral 
treatment was cost-effective in Australia (Figure 3, panels 
A and C). However, when we assumed that half of the time 
the emergent pandemic strain would have a different subtype 
than that chosen for the stockpiled vaccine (Figure 3, panels 
B and D), most simulations (willingness to pay >$12,000/
LYS) found that antiviral drug treatment alone was the op-
timal strategy.
Discussion 
Under the assumption of a severe pandemic occur-
ring in the near future, the pharmaceutical-based mitiga-
tion strategies examined were generally estimated to be 
cost-effective. For at least some of the plausible range of 
transmission parameters, strategies involving population 
prepandemic vaccination were effective in containing an 
outbreak until the arrival of a matched vaccine. A combina-
tion of antiviral drug treatment and prepandemic vaccina-
tion offered the best protection for the population. From 
a societal perspective, prepandemic vaccination was esti-
mated to be cost saving when compared with the minimum 
pharmaceutical intervention.
The cost-effectiveness of pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation 
strategies was quite resilient to major changes in inﬂ  uential 
parameters such as the value of R0 and the effectiveness of 
vaccination and antiviral drugs. This resilience stems from 
2 important assumptions: 1) we assumed that the pandemic 
would be severe (our base-case has similar characteristics to 
the 1918 pandemic); and 2) we assumed a pandemic would 
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Figure 3. Cost-effectiveness 
acceptability curves. Panels 
A and B show the healthcare 
system perspective; C and D 
show the societal perspective. 
In B and D, we assumed that 
half of the time (Q = 50%) 
the emergent pandemic 
strain would be would be 
of a subtype to which the 
stockpiled vaccine offered no 
protection. We did not explore 
the use of such a vaccine in 
subsequent pandemics. Costs 
and life-years discounted at 
5% annually. A$, Australian 
dollars; LYS, life-year saved.Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Mitigation Strategies
occur soon (5-year delay in base-case). The ﬁ  rst assump-
tion implies that the consequences of a pandemic would be 
large in terms of the number of deaths and the healthcare 
resources required, whereas the second assumption implies 
that the costs associated with maintaining a stockpile were 
limited and  that the future beneﬁ  ts would not be dramati-
cally reduced by discounting. Under these assumptions, 
even moderately effective interventions from a clinical per-
spective (e.g., a vaccine with 20% efﬁ  cacy) may be cost-
effective. When we assumed instead that the pandemic was 
relatively mild (case-fatality and case-hospitalization rates 
5× less than base-case) and occurred 30 years later, pan-
demic mitigation strategies were borderline cost-effective 
at best. This mild scenario still assumes a disease incidence 
several times that of seasonal inﬂ  uenza.
We found that vaccination and antiviral strategies dif-
fered in their sensitivity to certain key parameters (Figure 
2). Because the value for value for money offered by the 
intervention strategies was relatively similar, even minor 
changes in some parameters led strategies to become domi-
nated by a more effective alternative. For example, when 
VE increased above 41% (base-case 40%), antiviral drug 
treatment alone was dominated (extended) by prepandemic 
vaccination (strategy 3). This sensitivity highlights the in-
adequacy of a base-case analysis and the need for probabi-
listic sensitivity analysis (Figure 3).
This analysis was restricted by a lack of accurate infor-
mation on prepandemic VE. However, because any emer-
gent pandemic strain is unknown, some level of uncertainty 
around VE is unavoidable. We assumed that a prepandemic 
vaccine would offer moderate protection (below that of a 
matched seasonal vaccine), and using probabilistic sensi-
tivity analysis (Figure 3, panels B and D), we explored the 
risk that the emergent pandemic strain would be of a dif-
ferent subtype than that chosen for the stockpiled vaccine. 
We did not speciﬁ  cally explore the use of such a vaccine in 
subsequent future pandemics or the separate stockpiling of 
adjuvant and antigen. The effectiveness of antiviral drugs 
can also not be known with certainty in advance. We as-
sumed a static 10% resistance to antiviral drugs and varied 
this widely in sensitivity analysis. A more realistic model 
would take into consideration possible development of re-
sistance over time (37), but a detailed analysis of antiviral 
resistance was beyond the scope of our analysis.
Our model approach was deterministic so that although 
stochastic variation in parameters was considered, identical 
parameter choices led to identical model outputs. Because 
our analysis was limited to assessing the effect on overall 
attack rates and the costs and beneﬁ  ts associated with this, 
rather than outputs such as daily case counts, the inﬂ  uence 
of stochasticity at the simulation level should be relatively 
minor. Furthermore, the importation of cases from outside 
the country is likely to rapidly increase counts to a level at 
which deterministic behavior dominates. A major advan-
tage of a simple deterministic approach is that sensitivity 
analyses are not constrained by computational resources, 
enabling detailed uncertainty analysis.
We have largely ignored issues of capacity constraint. 
For instance, hospital bed day capacity is likely to be se-
verely strained during the peak of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
(38). A severe inﬂ  uenza pandemic is also likely to have a 
dramatic effect on the broader economy (39), which may 
not be captured well even under our societal perspective. 
Studies estimating the macroeconomic impact of a pan-
demic are beginning to emerge (40). The failure to capture 
the broader macroeconomic impact makes our healthcare 
system perspective conservative. However, the extent to 
which the beneﬁ  ts are captured (or not captured) is likely to 
be different for each strategy.
Population prepandemic vaccine and antiviral drug 
treatment strategies offer substantial scope to be cost-effec-
tive strategies for pandemic inﬂ  uenza mitigation. Unlike an-
tiviral treatment strategies, population prepandemic vaccina-
tion offers the possibility of containment until the arrival of 
a matched vaccine. The stockpiling of prepandemic vaccines 
should be carefully considered and take into account the cur-
rent level of uncertainty and budgetary limitations.
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